USA v. Ikim Blackett by unknown
2012 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-29-2012 
USA v. Ikim Blackett 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Ikim Blackett" (2012). 2012 Decisions. 933. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012/933 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2012 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
  
 
         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
 
No. 11-1556 
_______________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
 
v. 
 
IKIM BLACKETT, 
 
       Appellant 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the District Court 
of the Virgin Islands 
(D.C. Criminal No. 3-10-cr-00028-001) 
District Judge: Hon. Curtis V. Gomez 
_______________ 
 
Argued May 9, 2012 
 
BEFORE: CHAGARES, JORDAN and COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: May 29, 2012) 
 
Leonard B. Francis, Jr., Esq. (Argued) 
4A Dronningens 
P.O. Box 8838 
Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas 
USVI, 00801 
 
 Counsel for Appellant 
 
Kim R. Lindquist, Esq. 
Nolan D. Paige, Esq. (Argued) 
Office of the United States Attorney 
2 
 
5500 Veterans Building, Suite 260 
United States Courthouse 
Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas 
USVI, 00802-6924 
 
 Counsel for Appellee 
 
_______________ 
 
OPINION 
_______________ 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge.    
A jury convicted appellant of bribing a juror in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 201(b)(1)(A). On appeal, appellant argues that the court abused its discretion and 
committed reversible error by admitting into evidence 1) the text of a text message sent 
from the complaining witness, Jeannette Smith, to her sister; and 2) business records from 
Sprint.  For the following reasons, we will affirm. 
(1) Appellant argues that the text message is hearsay and does not fall within the 
“recorded recollection” exception to hearsay in Fed. R. Evid. 803(5), under which it was 
admitted. We need not decide whether the text message was admitted in error. Even if its 
admission was in error, it was harmless and must be disregarded. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a). 
The text message was cumulative of other evidence that someone visited Smith and 
offered her a bribe. It did not identify appellant. To the extent that the text message 
corroborates Smith‟s testimony and establishes her credibility, her testimony was 
corroborated, and credibility established, by other evidence. In this light, it is “„highly 
probable‟” that the evidence “„did not contribute to the jury‟s judgment of conviction.‟” 
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United States v. Jannotti, 729 F.2d 213, 219 (3d Cir. 1984) (quoting Government of 
Virgin Islands v. Toto, 529 F.2d 278, 284 (3d Cir. 1976)). As a result, the text message‟s 
admission, regardless of whether it was in error, cannot be a basis for reversal. 
 (2) Defendant argues that the Sprint records custodian who testified at trial was not 
competent to lay the foundation for the admission of the Sprint phone detail records. The 
records custodian testified to each of the requirements contained in Fed. R. Evid. 803(6) 
for the admission of business records based on his personal knowledge. As a result, there 
is no abuse of discretion in the admission of the business records through the records 
custodian who testified at trial. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court 
entered on March 1, 2011. 
